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COMMENT
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: THE MOVE TOWARD THE
RECOGNITION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS A BASIS
FOR ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1995 may come to be known as the "Year of the Woman"
not only in the United States, but also in the international community. Is-
sues that particularly affect women have gained world-wide attention. In
fact, the United Nations Fourth Conference on Women held in Beijing,
China, declared violence against women to be an urgent priority for na-
tions.' One pressing form of violence against women discussed at the
Conference was the practice of female genital mutilation performed in
some Third World countries. Female genital mutilation has been stimulat-
ing international debate because several women have fled their native
countries to escape the procedure and have sought asylum in western na-
tions. Recently, two U.S. immigration judges, in unpublished opinions,
heard and decided the cases of victims of female genital mutilation who
sought refugee status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 2
Case law reveals that United States courts have been reluctant to
grant asylum based on gender persecution or gender violence. This is pri-
1. Violence Against Women. THE U.N. CHRONICLE, Sept. 1995, at 48. The Conference
convened from September 4-15, 1995. Id. at 40. Violence against women was listed as
one of the twelve critical concerns of the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women plat-
form. Id. at 44. Three to four million are victimized by violence annually. According to
the Commission, approximately five girls are mutilated every minute. Id. at 40, 44, and
48.
2. See generally infra notes 100-141 and accompanying text. There has only been
one prior case of FGM before the Immigration Court; however, the judge did not analyze
the case under the framework of the Refugee Act or international law. The women and
her child were allowed to remain in the United States on humanitarian grounds. Jill Law-
erence, Gender Persecution New Reason for Asylum Human Rights: Women Face Bride-
Burning, Genital Mutilation, Forced Abortions and Politically Motivated Rape, but Na-
tions Have Been Slow to Grant Refuge, Los ANGELES TIMES, March 27, 1994 at 14.
96 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
madly due to the fact that women's claims have failed to fall neatly
within the court's interpretation of statutory provisions. Judicial interpre-
tation of the term "refugee" has created strict requirements that a foreign
national must meet in order to obtain asylum in the United States.3 This
Comment will show that the year 1995 marks a recent trend in the
United States toward the recognition of gender-based persecution claims
as a basis for asylum; however, the strict and rigid interpretation of the
Refugee Act will continue to serve as a hindrance to the granting of refu-
gee status to women who have suffered FGM or other violence particular
to gender.
Sections I and I of this Comment will lay the foundation for un-
derstanding both the human rights and refugee issues flowing from the
practice of female genital mutilation. Specifically, Section 1I will briefly
explain the practice of female genital mutilation in an effort to help
others better understand the plight of these asylum seekers. Section I
will discuss the status of women and refugees under international law
and United States law, which is essentially based on international law.
Sections IV and V will discuss and analyze the two female genital muti-
lation cases decided by two United States Immigration Courts. Finally,
Section VI will explain why the current acceptance of gender-based per-
secution and a generous application of the refugee definition is in accord
with both domestic and international law.
II. THE PRACTICE OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
Female genital mutilation (FGM), also referred to as female circum-
cision, consists of a surgical operation that removes, or partly removes,
and then sews a young girl's genitals. 4 The World Health Organization
estimates that this operation has been performed on more than eighty
million girls between the ages of six and eight in Africa and Asia.' In
forty African countries, unlicensed midwives or tribal elders practice
3. Karen Bower, Recognizing Violence Against Women as Persecution on the Basis
of Membership in A Particular Social Group, 7 GEo. IMmIGR. L. J. 173 (1993).
4. Pamela Constable, INS Debates Female Mutilation as Basis For Asylum, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 11, 1995 at Dl. See also EL DAREER ASTHMA. WOMAN WHY
Do You WEEP? 12 (1982).
5. ASTHMA, supra note 4, at 12. FGM is also practiced in Latin America and some
parts of Europe where large numbers of immigrants from Asia and Africa have migrated.
See OLAYiNKO Koso-THoMAs, THE CIRCUMCISION OF WOMEN: A STRATEGY FOR ERADICA-
TION 17 (1987). See also JENNIFER BINGHAM HuuL, BATTERED, RAPED AND VEILED, THE
Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, at 26. This Comment will focus on the practice of
FGM as it is employed in Africa.
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FGM as a means of protecting the virginity of unmarried women.6
Of the three ways that FGM can be performed, clitoridectomy is the
mildest practice. Also referred to as "sunna" in Muslim countries, this
procedure removes the prepuce (the protecting foreskin) of the clitoris.7
Because of the similarity of clitoridectomy to male circumcision, FGM is
sometimes referred to as female circumcision.8
Excision, the second procedure, consists of the removal of the pre-
puce, the clitoris, and all or part of the labia minora.9 Excision leaves the
labia majora and the rest of the vulva in place.10
Finally, infibulation is the most extreme procedure. Infibulation in-
volves the removal of the prepuce and the whole labia minora and
majora. 1" The two sides of the vulva are stitched together, leaving a
small opening for urination and menstruation. 2 This procedure often
damages a women's sexual organ, and therefore should not be equated
with male circumcision. 3
All three procedures are surgical operations that usually involve the
use of unsterilized equipment such as knives, scissors, razors, or pieces
of glass.' 4 The use of this unsterilized equipment has caused about 83%
of the women who undergo this surgery to suffer side effects.' 5 These
side effects include severe pain due to the lack of anesthesia, hemorrhag-
ing, shock, urinary infection, blood poisoning due to unhygienic condi-
tions, and death.' 6
Proponents of these procedures have advanced many arguments to
support their position. The most popular argument voiced in favor of
FGM contends that it preserves virginity and prevents promiscuity. 7 Be-
cause several African tribes prescribe virginity as a prerequisite for mar-
riage, supporters believe FGM protects a woman from her own desire to
6. ASTHMA, supra note 4, at 14-16.
7. OLAYIcA Koso-THoMAs, CIRCUMCISION OF WOMEN 15 (1987).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id. Clitoridectomy and excision are commonly practiced on the west coast of
Africa from the Republic of Mauritania, also in Central African countries such as Chad,
Kenya, North Egypt, and Tanzania. A few tribes in Botswana, Lesotho, and Mozambique
also perform clitoridectomy and excision. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Infibulation is practiced in Mali, Sudan, Somalia, and some parts of Ethiopia
and Northern Nigeria. Id.
14. HANNY LIGHTFOOr-KLEIN, PRISONERS OF A RITUAL: AN ODYSSEY INTO FEMALE
GENIrrAL CIRCUMCISION IN AFRICA 32 (1989).
15. Id. at 36.
16. Koso-THoMAS, supra note 7, at 29.
17. Id. at 25.
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have promiscuous sexual intercourse. 8
Second, supporters also contend that FGM promotes social and po-
litical cohesion.' 9 They believe FGM is an initiation process that all wo-
men are required to take part in to become full members of the group.20
Hence, women who do not have this surgical operation have failed to
take part in the bonding process and are ostracized from society. This ex-
clusion from society may entail losing the right to participate in the com-
munity, as well as voting privileges.2' Loss of certain tribal benefits also
extends to men of families who have uncircumcised daughters or wives.22
Third, others advance religious reasons in support of FGM. Some
Islamic scholars believe female Muslims should undergo the sunna proce-
dure. The Muslim faith requires cleanliness, and many Muslims believe
uncircumcised women are unclean. Female genitals are believed to be
foul smelling and unclean. 23
Finally, supporters argue that FGM improves the male's sexual plea-
sure.24 Many African cultures believe the man's sexual pleasure is para-
mount, and the woman serves as a vehicle for procuring his enjoyment.25
Those who advance this argument also believe the clitoris generates addi-
tional excitement for males, causing premature ejaculation and the dimin-
ishment of a male's pleasure.26 In sum, the reasons given for female gen-
ital mutilation are based on custom, myth, religion, and ignorance of
biological and medical facts.27
Ill. LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Status of Women in International Law
FGM and other violent acts committed against women have not
gone unnoticed by the international community. Through the use of trea-
ties, conferences, and resolutions, nations have opted to devise a uniform
standard for the treatment, progress and protection of women.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 9. See also LIGHTFOOT-KLEIN, supra note 14, at 3.
20. Koso-THomAs, supra note 7, at 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. There are some Muslims who do not believe the Koran teaches FGM. They
view this as a process for men to exercise control over women's bodies. ALiCE WALKER
AND PtArmHIA PARmAR. WARRIOR MARKs 325-27 (1993).
24. Koso-THomAs, supra note 7, at 3.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id.
27. LIGHTFoor-KLEIN, supra note 14, at 3.
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1. Equality
As early as 1967, nations recognized the grave inequality that ex-
isted between men and women. The international community attempted
to address this inequality with the enactment of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter "the Covenant")?8 Article
Three of the Covenant requires member nations to ensure that men and
women equally enjoy the rights enumerated by the Covenant.29 More im-
portantly, Article 26 of the Covenant contains an equal protection clause
which expressly prohibits discrimination based on sex?0 The Covenant
marked the beginning of an attempt by the international community to
eradicate the obstacles confronting women in the world. Unfortunately, it
did not accomplish the type of equality nations had hoped to attain.
Realizing this, a little more than a decade later, the United Nations
adopted General Assembly Resolution 180, Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereinafter
"CEFDAW") on December 18, 1979.31 CEFDAW, like the Covenant, ac-
knowledged that inequality existed between men and women, and that
this inequality hinders the progress of women. 32 The purpose of
CEFDAW was "to promote universal respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms without distinction of any kind, including any distinc-
tion as to sex."' 33 Article One defines discrimination as the "exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and wo-
men of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field."' 34 Article Two requires
that all state parties take appropriate steps to eliminate discrimination
against women, including the abolishment of discriminatory laws, cus-
toms, or practices. 35 CEDFAW also mandates the elimination of discrimi-
nation in the areas of voting, government representation, acquisition of
nationality, education, employment, marriage, and family relations. 36
28. Dec. 16, 1967, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
29. Id. at 172.
30. Id. at 179.
31. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M 33.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 44.
34. Id. at 36.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 37-39, 41.
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2. Protection From Violence
The international community has taken steps toward the eradication
of discrimination against women for some time now. Only recently, how-
ever, has violence against women risen to the forefront of international
concern. In December 1993, the General Assembly passed, without tak-
ing a vote, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Wo-
men (hereinafter "DEVAW")1 7 The resolution was drafted by the Com-
mission on the Status of Women, which found that violence against
women was a rising phenomenon committed in almost every nation.38
The General Assembly specifically recognized that violence against wo-
men blocked opportunity and thwarted the full realization of equality.3 9
Article One of DEVAW defines violence against women as "any gender-
based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts,
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public
or in private life. ' 4° According to Article Two, examples of violence
against women include rape, sexual harassment, forced prostitution, bride
burning and female genital mutilation.4
The General Assembly's resolution declares that violence against
women is an urgent problem and calls for member nations to take efforts
to punish, to prevent, to research, and to eliminate violence against wo-
men within their borders. 42 The resolution goes one step further by call-
ing for both national and international action.43 On the international level,
DEVAW requires organs of the United Nations to teach seminars and to
prepare guidelines and reports discussing the trends in violence against
women." Although the provisions of the resolution are not binding on
the United States, they have influenced the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service and U.S. immigration judges.
B. The Status of Refugees in International Law
Victims of female genital mutilation have entered other nations seek-
ing refugee status in order to remain lawfully in the country. International
37. G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/629, reprinted in
U.N.Y.B. 1046 (1993).
38. Id. at 1045. See also Violence Against Women, supra note 1, at 44.
39. DEVAW, 1993 U.N.Y.B. at 1046.
40. Id. at 1047.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1049.
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law has created uniform standards which many nations have adopted to
govern their treatment of foreign nationals. After World War H, the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights saw a need to have a uni-
versal instrument that would address the status of refugees and their indi-
vidual human rights in the international community.45 Prior to the League
of Nations, there were no international agreements that took into account
the special circumstances confronting refugees around the world.' As a
result, refugees were treated in accordance with the domestic law of the
nation that they were in.47 The need for uniformity and a universal law
was finally addressed with the passage of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948 and the Convention Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees of 1951 (amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees of 1967).
Articles 13 and 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provide everyone the right to freely move and reside within the borders
of each state, which is essential for refugees who seek to leave their
country.41 Specifically, Article 14, clause 2, states everyone has the right
to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution.49 The creation of this right
was essential for refugees who sought to leave their countries and find
solace in other nations. However, it was not until 1951, with the enact-
ment of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, that the inter-
national community gave a universal definition to the term "refugee";
set a minimum standard of treatment of refugees; and created basic rights
that should be accorded to them in their country of refuge.5°
According to Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, 51 a refugee is one who has a
45. 149 A.W. LEYDE SuTHoFF. CoucED CouRsEs OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF IN-
T.RNATIONAL LAW 311 (1976).
46. 8 HuMAN RELATIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL-ENcYCLOPEDIA PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 454 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res. 217 (I1 1948) reprinted in
Louis HENKIN ET AL.. BASIc DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 383
(1985).
49. SuHOFF, supra note 45, at 316. Article 14, clause 2, qualifies the phrase for the
United States. Persecution must be for political crimes or from acts in accord with the
principles of the United States. Id. The original text went as far as giving everyone the
right to be granted asylum. The text was edited in order to conform with the tradition of
each state possessing the freedom to grant or not to grant asylum to a refugee. Id. at 317.
50. Id. at 311-12.
51. July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention].
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well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country; or who not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to re-
turn to it.52
It is important to note that the Convention does not make asylum an
automatic right; rather, persons are given a right to seek asylum under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Once a foreign national
meets the criteria of "refugee," the Convention sets a minimum standard
of treatment that should be accorded to all refugees wherever they may
be in the world.53 Moreover, Article 33 of the Convention prohibits coun-
tries that have adopted the Convention from expelling a refugee lawfully
in their territory, except on grounds of national security or public order.5 4
In addition to this provision, Article 33 also contains a non-refoulment
clause that forbids the return of a refugee to a territory where his or her
life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.55
Originally, the Convention was created for European nationals, who
exclusively made up the refugee population.56 At the end of World War
II, citizens fleeing communist countries in Eastern Europe or oppressive
governments of Middle Eastern countries comprised the refugee popula-
tion.57 Later, this population grew, and many refugees began to emigrate
not only from European countries but from countries all over the world.58
The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees5 9 amended the Conven-
tion, and it was enacted to expand the definition of refugees to include
52. Id. at 152.
53. Id. at 156. Basic rights of refugees include non-discrimination, access to courts,
employment, public education, identity papers, and travel documents. See id. at 156, 162,
164, 166, 168, and 172.
54. Id. at 176.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. S. Rep. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979).
58. AusmiN T. FRAoomEN & SvEvEN C. BLL. IMmGRATION FUNDAMENTALS § 6.1
(1996).
59. January 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 268, 19 U.S.T. 6223 [hereinafter Protocol]. The
United States became a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees by way of the Protocol. Canada is also a member of the Protocol.
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non-European nationals-'
C. Refugee Law in the United States
1. Refugee Act
United States refugee law is codified in what is known as the U.S.
Refugee Act of 1980. The Refugee Act is based on international law,
particularly the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The
Act amended section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act by
adopting, in part, the Convention's definition. With the enactment of the
statute, Congress intended to bring United States law into conformity
with the Protocol. 61 Furthermore, the provisions of the Act were to be in-
terpreted in accordance with the Protocol's definition.62 The Act defines
refugee as:
Any person who is outside any country of such person's national-
ity or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable and unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group or political opinion.63
With the implementation of this Act, many hoped that there would
be a removal of the prior restrictions of granting refugee status in the
United States.64 Hence, "by eliminating the previous geographic and ide-
ological restrictions on granting refugee status, the act enables a more
flexible system for refugee admissions and assistance." The Act elimi-
nated the use of custom and instituted a uniform system and practice for
60. Protocol, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268, 19 U.S.T. at 6223.
61. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987).
62. Id.
63. INA § 101(a) (as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)). Compare Convention,
189 U.N.T.S. at 152. The refugee definition applies to section 208 of the INA, codified in
8 U.S.C. § 1158, which details the procedure for granting asylum to individuals already
in the United States. Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, there was no statute governing
this process. The refugee definition also applies to section 207 and 208 of the INA, codi-
fied in 8 U.S.C. § 1157, which detail procedure for granting asylum to individuals who
are in other countries. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 433.
64. Statement by Ambassador Victor H. Palmeri before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee in Washington D.C. (April 30, 1980), printed in 19 I.L.M. 700 (1980) (citing Bu-
reau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Current Policy No. 178 (1980)).
65. id.
1997]
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the admission of refugees.66
a. Persecution
Despite the hopes for a flexible system and the removal of prior re-
strictions, judicial interpretation of the Refugee Act has produced the
opposite result. The Board of Immigration Appeals and federal courts
have been given the authority to interpret the various terms of the ref-
ugee definition, as well as formulating a standard for the classification
of refugees. According to the courts, under section 208(a) of the act, a
foreign national must prove four elements in order to be eligible for
asylum. First, an alien must have a fear of persecution. Second, this
fear must be well-founded. Third, the fear of persecution must be
based on either race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. Finally, the national must be unwill-
ing to return to his country or to the country in which he last resided
because of the persecution. 67
i. Fear
The Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Acosta, a frequently
cited case, defined persecution as "harm or suffering that is inflicted
upon an individual in order to punish him for possessing a belief or char-
acteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome. ' '68 Persecution also involved
threats to life or freedom.69 In contrast, harsh conditions shared by many
or conditions that U.S. society may find indecent, wrong or unfair do not
amount to persecution.70 The Acosta court restricted persecution to mean
extreme conduct. Other courts, following Acosta, have supported this in-
terpretation and have stated that Congress did not intend to create a
broad definition of the term "persecution" because it would, in effect, al-
66. S. Rep. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1979).
67. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), modified on other grounds,
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). See also Cardoza-Fonesca, 480
U.S. at 447-49 (rejecting the interpretation Acosta's requirement of proving a "realistic
likelihood of persecution" as too stringent).
68. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211.
69. Id. at 222.
70. Id. The court also noted that the United Nations Convention and Protocol recog-
nized persecution to mean extreme conduct. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3rd
Cir. 1993) (citing OFFicE OF UNrrED NATIONS COMnsIoNER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES AND CRIERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CON-
VENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES § 51, 54, 55
(1979)).
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low a large number of people to qualify for asylum. 71 The Board of Im-
migration Appeals reasoned that the rules of statutory interpretation re-
quired the court to assume that Congress, "in using the term
'persecution' in the definition of a refugee under section 101(a) (42)(a)
of the Act, intended to adopt the judicial and administrative construction
of that term existing prior to the Refugee Act of 1980."72
ii. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
Under the second element, an asylum applicant may qualify for asy-
lum based on past persecution alone or a well-founded fear of future per-
secution under section 208(a) of the Refugee Act.73 An act of past perse-
cution is prima facie evidence that a foreign national faces persecution
now.74 Once an applicant establishes past persecution in a deportation
hearing, the Immigration and Naturalization Service may rebut this pre-
sumption by showing there is no evidence of persecution in the country
at the present time. 7 If the INS fails, the applicant has satisfied her bur-
den of proof. On the other hand, when there has been no past persecu-
tion, an applicant must prove that she has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.
The well-founded fear standard has two components: a subjective
component and an objective component.76 The test formulated by the
courts under the subjective element requires the fear to be genuine, and it
must be the alien's primary motivation for seeking asylum in a country. 7
The test formulated under the objective component is whether a reasona-
ble person in the same circumstances would fear persecution if forced to
71. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
72. Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 222-23.
73. Gerbremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1993).
74. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(1)(1) (1993).
75. Id.
76. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 807 F.2d 1571, 1579 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Gomez v.
INS, 947 F.2d 660, 663 (2nd Cir. 1991). "Well-founded fear of persecution should not be
confused with withholding deportation under § 243(h) of the INA, as amended in 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h), which states an alien must prove by a clear probability that her life
will be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or member-
ship in a particular social group. The clear probability standard is more stringent and re-
quires an alien show more likely than not he will be subject to persecution." Sanchez-
Tujillo, 807 F.2d at 1578. See generally, Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421 (holding
§ 243(h) of the INA "clear probability" standard does not govern the "well-founded
fear" standard under § 208(a) of the INA).
77. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 220. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has interpreted the Protocol as requiring fear to be the primary moti-
vation for seeking refugee status in a country. Id.
1997]
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return to the country of the applicant.78 Since an applicant has the burden
of proof, she must produce evidence in the form of documents or testi-
mony alleging specific facts from which an inference can be made that
she may be singled out for persecution based on one of the five catego-
ries.79 In addition, this evidence must show that the foreign national is in
a unique predicament in comparison with her fellow countrymen. 0
iii. Fear on Account of Membership in a Particular Social Group
Once persecution has been established, element three requires an ap-
plicant to prove that this actual persecution or well founded fear of per-
secution is on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group. "Essentially, the alien must pro-
duce some evidence connecting his or her subjective fear to his or her
membership in one of the five numerated categories.' s Most commonly,
women applicants seeking refugee status based on FGM or gender-based
violence attempt to prove persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group. In order to prove membership in a particular so-
cial group, a foreign national must "(1) identify a group that constitutes
a particular social group, (2) establish that he is a member of that group
and (3) show that she would be persecuted or has a well-founded fear of
persecution based on membership in that group."'8 2
According to the Acosta court, a social group consists of "a group
of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.
8 3
The court also offered a few examples of groups who share common
characteristics. These common characteristics included sex, color, or kin-
ship.84 The court noted that ultimate classification into a particular social
group would have to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.85 As a result,
the courts have encountered difficulty in defining this provision of the
statute, often reaching contradictory conclusions." For instance, the court
78. Safie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 639 (8th Cir. 1994).
79. Gomez, 940 F.2d at 663.
80. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1579 (citation omitted).
81. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663.
82. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
83. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. The court formulated this definition by applying
the contract principle of interpretation - ejusdem generis. "Membership in a particular
social group" follows race, religion, nationality and political opinion, all of which are
characteristics people can not change, or, in the case of political opinion, should not be
required to change. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See e.g. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576 (stating a family constituted a partic-
ular social group). But see Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1991)
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in Acosta reasoned that gender could constitute a social group; however,
some courts have rejected this and have held that women alone do not
constitute a particular social group for purposes of the statute. These
courts have stated that gender is too broad a characteristic."
2. INS Guidelines
Discouraged by the treatment of women seeking refugee status
under this statutory framework, human rights and women's groups began
to protest the system as being unfair.88 In response to this criticism, the
INS issued guidelines in 1995 to serve two basic goals. One, the guide-
lines attempt to "emphasize the importance of creating a 'customer-
friendly' asylum interview environment that allows women claimants to
discuss freely the details of their claims; and . . . describe how such
claims should be analyzed." 89 Two, the guidelines attempt to promote
consistency in procedures and decisions.90
The guidelines list "sexual abuse, rape, infanticide, genital mutila-
tion, forced marriage, slavery, domestic violence and forced abortion" as
harms peculiar to women.91 The guidelines even go one step further by
suggesting persecution can occur when "governmental measures that
compel an individual to engage in conduct that is not physically harmful
but is abhorrent to that individual's deepest beliefs."' The INS, however,
has issued a warning: the infliction of these harms does not automatically
warrant the grant of asylum. Women will still have to meet the statutory
requirements of "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of one of the five groups." 93
The INS guidelines have also attempted to clarify the case law by
stating that gender combined with other factors may define a particular
social group.94 This approach is consistent with that of the UNHCR Ex-
ecutive Committee, which has recognized the fact that "in the exercise of
their sovereign authority, nations are free to adopt the interpretation that
women asylum seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their
(holding that a family could not constitute a particular social group).
87. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
88. Nancy Kelly et al., Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, 71 INTERPRET RE
LEASES 813, June 27, 1994, at 813.
89. INS Publishes Guidelines, 72 INTERPRErER REEASES 757, June 5, 1995, at 772.
90. Considerations For Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women,
printed in 72 INTEnuR RELEAsEs 757, June 5, 1995, at 781 [hereinafter Guidelines].
91. Id. at 785 (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 784.
94. Id. at 789.
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having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live
may be considered as a 'particular social group' within the meaning of
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. '""
Although the guidelines are not as expansive as some would have
liked, women's and human rights groups have praised them. Human
rights groups believe that now women will not be so easily precluded
from acquiring refugee status.96 They also hope that these guidelines will
ensure that gender-based violence will be taken more seriously.9 Like-
wise, women's advocates believe the guidelines will result in more accu-
rate decisions.98
IV. THE CASES
The FGM cases arose and were decided against this immense legal
backdrop. In the Matter of Daphne Hannah Johnson," respondent John-
son, a female native of Sierra Leone, sought refugee status under section
208 of the INA1' ° and withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of
the INA'01 from the U.S. Immigration Court in Baltimore, Maryland. On
April 20, 1989, Johnson entered the United States on a temporary visi-
tor's visa.1t 2 She remained in the United States in violation of section
95. Id. at 787.
96. Id. at 781.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Case No. A72 370 565, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Baltimore,
Maryland (April 28, 1995).100. Section 208 (a) of the INA gives the Attorney General discretion to grant asy-
lum to an alien physically present in the United States if he or she falls within the defini-
tion of refugee. A refugee is "any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion." Immigration and Nationality Act § 208 (a), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42).
101. Section 243 (h) states "the Attorney General shall not deport or return any
alien (other than an alien described in section 1251 (a)(4)(d) of this title) to a country if
the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h).
102. Johnson, Case No. A72 370 565 at 2. Section 241 (a)(l)(B) reads "any alien
who entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General or is in the United States in violation of this chapter
or any other law of the United States is deportable." Immigration and Nationality Act
241 (a)(1)(B), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1)(B).
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241(a)(1)(b) of the INA. 10 3 At her deportation hearing, Johnson, through
counsel, stated that she would be persecuted within the meaning of the
statute if she were deported to Sierra Leone. Johnson feared that she
would be imprisoned or put to death as punishment for her involvement
with the opposition party to the present government. 1°4 As a second con-
tention, Johnson argued that she would be subject to persecution in the
form of female genital mutilation if she were returned to Sierra Leone? °5
Although she had already undergone the procedure, her fear was predi-
cated on the fact that her children would be forced to undergo the proce-
dure upon their returnA0
U.S. Immigration Judge Gossart, sitting in Baltimore, denied John-
son's application for asylum and withholding of deportation. 1°7 The U.S.
Immigration Court in Baltimore based its reasoning on several grounds.
First, the court held that Johnson would not suffer statutory persecu-
tion.' °s Judge Gossart opined that Johnson's claim of persecution based
on female genital mutilation was flawed because she had already been
circumcised. 1 9 Essentially, her claim rested on a well-founded fear of fu-
ture persecution of her daughters, who were not within the Immigration
Court's jurisdiction."10
Furthermore, the U.S. Immigration Court in Baltimore did not find
Johnson's worry of ostracism in retaliation for her disapproval of the
practice to be credible."' This worry was deemed to be highly subjective
and therefore not amounting to the necessary level of persecution." 2 In
addition, according to the court, persecutors had to be the government or
an organization unable to be controlled by the government. In this case,
persecutors were tribal elders who failed to fall within this definition." 3
Although the court empathized with the plight of Johnson, it nevertheless
concluded that disagreement with tribal customs did not amount to perse-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 3-4.
107. id. at 12.
108. Johnson, Case No. A72 370 565 at 12.
109. Id. Respondent Johnson also sought refugee status based on her persecution on
account of her political opinion. This claim also failed. The court found her involvement
in politics to be minimal, and her single incident of imprisonment did not amount to past
persecution. Id. at 12-13.
110. Id. at 12.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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cution as prescribed by the U.S. Refugee Act.' 14
Even if persecution were found, the Baltimore Immigration Court
held that it was not on account of membership in a particular social
group, because Johnson did not qualify as member of a "social group"
under the statute. Johnson's counsel argued that she belonged to a group
of Sierra Leonean women who did not practice FGM. According to the
court, there was no evidence that this group existed or that the govern-
ment recognized it."5 The Immigration Court conceded Johnson was a
female and could not change that fact; however, she could change her
opinions concerning the practice of FGM.116 In sum, Judge Gossart was
not persuaded by the evidence that Johnson suffered persecution, or that
if she did, it was not on account of membership within a particular social
group.
In The Matter of M.K,17 respondent M.K., another native of Sierra
Leone, requested relief from deportation pursuant to section 208(a)118 and
243(h)" 9 of the INA. The basic facts of this case are similar to those of
Johnson. M.K. legally entered the United States on a tourist visa on Au-
gust 9, 1991 and overstayed her time limit without authorization. 20
M.K.'s asylum claim was based on three grounds: she would face perse-
cution in Sierra Leone for her resistance to forcibly-imposed female geni-
tal mutilation; her resistance to spousal abuse; and her resistance to the
reigning government.' 21
In M.K., Judge Nejelski granted the respondent asylum. The Virginia
Immigration Court found persecution based on FGM for several reasons.
According to the court, persecution was defined as "physical, psycholog-
ical and verbal abuse that constitutes extreme conduct; violations of
human rights instruments; and discriminatory treatment that would lead
to an inability to earn a living, practice religion, or access education."'
M.K.'s persecution claim fell within all three categories. First, M.K.'s
past female mutilation caused her physical and psychological harm. 23
Second, Sierra Leone ratified various human rights conventions concern-
ing the treatment of women, and the practice of genital mutilation was
114. Id.
115. Johnson, Case No. A72 370 565 at 11.
116. Id.
117. Case No. A72 374 558, Executive Office for Immigration Review Arlington,
Virginia (April 28, 1995).
118. See supra note 101.
119. See supra note 102.
120. M.K., Case No. A72 374 558 at 2.
121. Id. at 1.
122. Id. at 12 (citations omitted).
123. Id.
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contrary to the basic rights listed in those conventions.1 24 Third, FGM
constituted discriminatory behavior aimed specifically at women.125 Be-
cause FGM was forced upon the respondent, the U.S. Immigration Court
found that M.K. had satisfied her burden of proof by establishing past
persecution, and the INS failed to rebut this presumption through a show-
ing of changed circumstances in Sierra Leone. 26 In addition, the court
went further and found a well-founded fear of persecution as well.
M.K.'s tribe, the Bundo Society, threatened to kill anyone who had re-
vealed their "secret" - genital mutilation. 27 Since the Bundo Society
was a major power in the country, the U.S. Immigration Court in Vir-
ginia concluded this threat to be country-wide, meeting the requirement
announced in Acosta. 28 As a result of this dominion, M.K. would have
been unable to avoid persecution by moving to another part of Sierra
Leone.
In Johnson, Judge Gossart did not find persecution due to the lack
of government involvement in the actual practice of FGM and the lack of
express sanctioning of tribal activities.'29 Ironically, in M.K., Judge Nejel-
ski found that the same government's unwillingness to stop that abuse
amounted to persecution. 30 Because FGM was so widespread, being per-
formed on 80% of the women, the court was persuaded that the govern-
ment of Sierra Leone was cognizant of the abuse.' 3' Moreover, the gov-
ernment had, in essence, tolerated the practice by failing to provide legal
recourse to mutilated women. 32
In its analysis, the court specifically acknowledged gender-based
persecution as a basis for asylum, as well as for a violation of interna-
tional human rights guarantees. In accordance with the INS guidelines,
the U.S. Immigration Court asserted that women may apply for refugee
status if persecution or harm is peculiar to gender. 33 Examples of harm
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 7. At the age of twenty-one, M.K. was forcibly mutilated despite her
strong objections to the operation. After giving birth, M.K. stayed with her parents. One
night she was tied, blindfolded, and taken to the jungle where her clitoris and labia mi-
nora were removed. Following the operation, M.K. bled for four hours. She was
threatened with death if she ever told anyone about the operation. Id. at 7-8.
127. Id. at 14.
128. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
129. Johnson, Case No. A72 370 565 at 11-12.
130. M.K., Case No. A-72-374-558 at 13.
131. Id. FGM is not performed on Creole women who make up twenty percent of
the population. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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that are peculiar to women include rape, sexual abuse, forced abortion,
domestic violence, and female genital mutilation. 3 4 In addition to using
the INS guidelines in support of its reasoning, the court cited various in-
ternational documents which enumerated the human rights of women.
3 5
Although Judge Nejelski admitted he was not "directly bound by interna-
tional law, international law [was] helpful in identifying internationally-
recognized human rights." 136
The U.S. Immigration Court in Virginia also noted that victims of
FGM or any other gender-based persecution could be granted refugee sta-
tus for persecution on account of membership in a particular social
group. 137 Instead of recognizing the entire gender as a social group, the
court limited the social group to a subgroup of women "who are either
targeted for the harm or denied protection from the harm because of their
membership in that group."' 3 The U.S. Immigration Court opined that
M.K. belonged to the sub-group of Sierra Leone women who were
forced to undergo FGM.' 39 According to the court, M.K. was persecuted
on account of her membership in this sub-group. In conclusion, Judge
Nejelski agreed that cultures and traditions of other countries should be
respected; however, the practice of FGM was "cruel and serves no medi-
cal purpose."140
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Debate: Restrictive vs. Generous Application of the Refugee
Definition
Immediately following the release of these opinions, critics de-
nounced the reasoning of Judge Gossart and his ruling to return the
mother to Sierra Leone.'4 ' Many could not understand how two similar
cases could result in strikingly different opinions. Despite this commen-
tary, the two opinions can be distinguished. In Johnson, the respondent
134. Id.
135. Id. at 16. These international agreements included the International Convenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Declaraton on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Id.
136. M.K., No. A 72-374-558 at 15 (U.S. Immigration Court, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
April 28, 1995)
137. Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
138. Id. (citing Women Refugee Project Guidelines supra note 89, at 819).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 19 (citation ommitted).
141. See Pamela Constable, INS Debates Female Mutilation as Basis for Asylum,
WASHNGTON POST, September 11, 1995, at Dl.
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focused on FGM as it pertained to her children, who were U.S. citizens
and not within the jurisdiction of the court. In M.K., the focus was on
FGM as it applied to the respondent only. Furthermore, the INS had not
yet promulgated the guidelines, which govern the treatment of women
seeking refugee status, when Johnson was decided. 142 Although both of
these factors may plausibly explain the difference in these decisions, a
deeper analysis of the reasoning discussed in the opinions reveals the de-
bate between the courts and human fights groups. This debate, more like
a tug-of-war, has existed since the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980
and has risen to the forefront in 1995. Specifically, the debate has fo-
cused on whether to apply the refugee definition generously or restric-
tively. 43 The popular view, favored by the court, advocates a restrictive
application of the refugee definition. As seen in past judicial opinions,
the goal has been to limit the number of refugees able to enter and gain
asylum in the U.S., being mindful of opening the flood gates. 144 On the
other hand, human rights groups advocate applying the refugee definition
generously. According to this view, the Refugee Act was enacted to pro-
vide a flexible system and, more importantly, to remove the restrictions
that were already in place prior to the passage of the statute. 45 The re-
cent trend has been to adopt the latter vit;w and to apply a more gener-
ous interpretation of the refugee definition.
The reasoning of the U.S. Immigration Court in Baltimore in John-
son is in accord with judicial precedent that has sought to apply the refu-
gee definition in a restrictive manner. Prior to 1993, courts had reasoned
that a more expansive definition of persecution would significantly in-
crease the percentage of individuals who would qualify for asylum in this
country, and the courts thought it unlikely that Congress intended such a
result. Thus, courts have refused to give refugee status to "every alien
displaced by general conditions of unrest or violence in his or her home
country. Refugee status simply does not extend [that] far."' 46
This restrictive ideology can be seen in gender-based persecution
cases other than Johnson. For example, in Campos-Guardado v. INS, 47
the Fifth Circuit refused to confer refugee status on a woman who was
raped and threatened in El Salvador. The court held that the harm feared
142. The INS issued the guidelines on May 26, 1995. See Guidelines, supra note
91, at 781. In Re Matter of Daphne Johnson was decided on April 28, 1995. Johnson,
Case No. A72 370 565 at 14.
143. See generally infra notes 147-91 and accompanying text.
144. See e.g, Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d at 1233 (3d. Cir. 1993).
145. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
146. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.
147. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1989).
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was not on account of her political opinion or membership in a particular
social group."48 Campos-Guardado, an El Salvadoran, was raped by a
group of men while visiting her uncle, who was the chairman of a local
agricultural cooperative." 49 Prior to her visit, her uncle had been
threatened by two men who demanded the cooperative's money- 5° In ad-
dition to being raped, she was forced to watch her attackers murder her
uncle and cousin by striking them with a machete, and ultimately shoot-
ing them with a gun.' 5' Upon her escape, the respondent suffered a ner-
vous breakdown and was hospitalized for two weeks.
152
On a subsequent visits to her parents' home, she saw one of her at-
tackers.1 53 He threatened to kill her if she revealed his identity 54 Cam-
pos-Guardado later escaped to the United States in 1984 where she
sought asylum.155 In upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
decision, the Fifth Circuit stated that Campos-Guardado failed to show
that her attackers harmed her in order to overcome her political opin-
ions. 1 56 The court agreed with the BIA when it found that Campos-
Guardado's attackers had not targeted her as required by the statute, but
that she was attacked merely for being at the wrong place at the wrong
time. 5 7 Her attackers had no way of knowing she would be there. 5 Fur-
thermore, their threat was aimed at preventing the exposure of their iden-
tity and "there was no indication he maintained an interest in her be-
cause of her political opinion or any other grounds specified in the
Act."1 59
Another example of the restrictive application of the refugee defini-
tion can be seen in Gomez v. INS. 60 Gomez, another Salvadoran woman,
appealed the BIA's determination that she failed to meet statutory re-
148. Id. at 290.
149. Id. at 287.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Campos-Guardado, 809 E2d at 288.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. See also Matter of Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975). Respondent
sought withholding of deportation under 243(h) of the INA. She alleged her husband had
threatened her life and attempted to kill her by attempting to bum down her house. Re-
spondent was denied asylum because she failed to show her husband sought persecution
on account of any of the five enumerated grounds. The court reasoned her husband's mo-
tives were "strictly personal" and therefore beyond the scope of the statute. Id. at 461.
160. 947 F.2d 660 (2nd Cir. 1991).
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quirements. 161 Guerillas had raped and beaten Gomez on five separate oc-
casions within a two year span. 162 In 1990 she applied for refugee
status.1
6 3
The Second Circuit agreed with the BIA's determination that Gomez
failed to show that the beatings and rape were based on her membership
in a particular social group or on account of any other ground enumer-
ated in the statute.164 Gomez contended that she belonged to a group of
women who had previously been abused and that these women consti-
tuted a social group for purposes of the statute. 165 According to the court,
women who had previously been abused only shared two common char-
acteristics - gender and youth.'6 Like the court in Johnson, the Gomez
court sympathized with the respondent and other Salvadoran women who
had been inflicted with physical and emotional pain; however, it never-
theless found no evidence of Gomez being singled out for persecution. 67
The court concluded that she was no more likely to be persecuted than
any other young woman in El Salvador.'6
In response, critics have argued that this restrictive and narrow inter-
pretation of the statute has turned away foreign nationals who face a real
risk of harm, particularly women who will face persecution for the mere
fact of their gender. 69 This dissent has spawned the issuance of the INS
guidelines170 and a generous application of the refugee definition to in-
clude victims of gender-based persecution. For example, in 1993, the
Third Circuit interpreted persecution to include governmental measures
requiring some women to wear traditional veils.' 7' This persecution could
be on account of membership in a particular social group (i.e. Iranian
women who find the requirement of wearing a veil repulsive to their be-
liefs). 72 Two years later, the Ninth Circuit followed suit when it reversed
161. Id. at 662.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 663.
165. Id. at 664.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Bower, supra note 1, at 173. See also Sunny Kim, Gender-Related Persecu-
tion: A Legal Analysis of Gender Bias in Asylum Law, 2 AM. U. GENDER & L J. 107,
108-09 (1994).
170. For a full discussion of the guidelines see supra notes 89-99 and accompanying
text.
171. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1993).
172. Id. at 1241. Fatin's punishment for noncompliance with the law could have re-
sulted in 74 lashes, one year imprisonment, rape or death. Id.
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the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision not to grant asylum to
an Iranian woman. 1' According to the court, "being forced to conform
to, or being sanctioned for failing to comply with, a conception of Islam
that is fundamentally at odds with one's own belief also can rise to the
level of persecution."' 74 Fisher, an Iranian woman, argued that her arrest
for viewing a friend in a bathing suit and for allowing her hair to be-
come visible were signs that "she [had been] harassed for refusing to ad-
here to the regime's fundamentalist Moslem doctrines."'' 75 According to
the respondent, these requirements of the Khomeini government were
against her beliefs, and, if deported, she would suffer persecution at the
hands of government officials. 176
In remanding the case, the Ninth Circuit announced that Fisher
could show persecution on account of religion if the moral codes would
be enforced upon her as punishment for her beliefs. 77 Also, Fisher could
prove persecution on account of political opinion if she was viewed as an
"enemy of the regime" or a "political dissenter."' 18
A generous application of the refugee definition has also occurred at
the intermediate level. In a case of first impression, the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals granted asylum based on FGM. In In Re Fauziva Kas-
inga,'" the applicant argued that if she were deported to Togo, her home
country, she would be subject to FGM. The BIA found FGM to be per-
secution under the Refugee Act. 80 The evidence had shown that FGM
served no legitimate purpose. Those who advocated use of the procedure
only sought to control a woman's sexuality and promote "male domi-
nance and exploitation."''8 The evidence showed that this persecution
was country-wide, and neither the government nor the police did any-
thing to protect the women from the violence or abuse. 82 Kasinga's per-
secution was on account of her membership in particular social groups:
she was a young woman and a member of the Tchamba Kunsuntu Tribe.
These were identified as characteristics the respondent was unable to
change. This modern view has also trickled down to the United States
Immigration Courts. In the Matter of M.K. is in accord with the recent
173. Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1995).
174. Id. at 1376.
175. Id. at 1369.
176. Id. at 1370.
177. Id. at 1377.
178. Id. at 1378.
179. 1996 WL 379826 (BIA 1996).
180. Id. at *8.
181. Id. at *9.
182. Id. at *10.
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trend toward recognition of gender-based persecution as a basis for asy-
lum and has applied the refugee definition generously. For example, In
the Matter of A and Z, an unpublished opinion, Judge Nejelski of the
U.S. Immigration Court in Virginia granted asylum to a Jordanian woman
who was a victim of spousal abuse.8 3 It is believed to be the first opin-
ion to have granted asylum based on spousal abuse. 84
The U.S. Immigration Court in Virginia reasoned that respondent's
subjection to continual abuse amounted to persecution.'1 The INS argued
the respondent's situation was a personal, marital dispute.1 16 The Immi-
gration Court disagreed and found that the respondent was persecuted on
account of both her political opinion and her membership in a particular
social group.1 7 Respondent was a member of the group defined as those
women who held Western beliefs and values and who were "unwilling to
live at the mercy of their husbands, their society or their government."'88
Moreover, the A and Z opinion has been followed by the Board of
Immigration Appeals. In another unpublished opinion, one year later, the
BIA granted asylum to a Haitian woman who had been raped for her re-
ligious beliefs and political activism. 89 "This decision is a further exam-
ple of a recent trend in immigration law in which the INS, administrative
tribunals, and federal courts have been more willing to grant claims of
asylums filed by women based on types of persecution specific to
women." 190
B. A Generous Application of the Refugee Definition is the Correct
Approach
Courts have been able to grant refugee status to victims of gender-
based persecution by applying a generous application of the refugee defi-
nition. This generous application extends the principles announced in
Acosta.19' Acosta proclaimed that "harsh conditions shared by many
other persons did not amount to persecution."'9 A literal interpretation
183. IJ Grants Asylum to Woman Based on Spousal Abuse, INS Guidelines Immi-
nent, 72 INERa'PRE=na RELEAsEs 521, April 17, 1995 at 521.
184. Id. at 522.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra note 184, at 772 (citing Matter of - Krome) (BIA int. dec. No.
3252, May 25, 1993)).
190. See supra note 184, at 522.
191. Fisher, 61 F.3d at 1375.
192. Acosta, 19 I & N. Dec. at 222.
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of this phrase would bar gender-based violence claims because violence
such as FGM is practiced on millions of women. The extension of
Acosta is in accord with legislative history and international law.
1. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Refugee Act offers no guidance in ac-
tually defining the terms of the statute. It does, on the other hand, expose
the general purpose and goals of the Refugee Act. One, legislators hoped
to eradicate the discriminatory treatment of refugees that had arisen
under the ad hoc system 93 Two, they had also hoped the statute would
result in the fair and equal treatment of all refugees. 94 Third, "it gives
statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and hu-
manitarian concerns, not reflected in the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952."'19 A generous application of the refugee definition accom-
plishes these goals. Under the narrow interpretation of the refugee defini-
tion, women with legitimate claims were turned away. 96 Now, for the
first time, women's claims are being heard and taken seriously, resulting
in the fulfillment of the Act's primary goal of treating all equally and
fairly. A generous application of the refugee definition also demonstrates
the United States' commitment to human rights and humanitarian con-
cems. For example, in In the Matter of M.K., the Immigration Court rec-
ognized fundamental human rights found in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women and the Declaration on the Elimination of Vio-
lence Against Women.'9 The opinion showed, for the first time, that the
United States was concerned with violations of human rights enunciated
in these international treaties. Thus, a generous application of the refugee
definition promotes the Refugee Act's purpose of equality, nondiscrimi-
nation and dedication to human rights.
2. International Law
The major aim of the Refugee Act was to bring the United States
into conformity with international law, the U.N. Convention and the Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 98 Although not binding, inter-
193. S. Rep. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id. at 1.
196. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 121, at 15-16.
198. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 220.
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pretation of these two conventions has been cited as persuasive author-
ity. 99 Under the Protocol, persecution includes threat to life or freedom
or serious violations of human rights on account of one of the five cate-
gories3° In addition, persecutors may be non-governmental agents if the
government officials tolerate the persecution or refuse to offer protection
from such persecution? °! The practice of FGM would constitute persecu-
tion under the Protocol's definition. The international community has rec-
ognized FGM and other gender-based violence as a "serious human
rights violation." In fact, the U.N. Convention placed FGM as number
twelve on its list of concerns requiring immediate action m Also, under
the Protocol, tribal elders and others can be agents of persecution. Often,
the government tolerates various forms of persecution peculiar to women
and refuses to intervene.203
Finally, Canadian courts have also applied the refugee definition
generously. Canada, like the United States, has adopted the Protocol's
definition. In fact, it was the first Western nation to recognize gender-
based violence as a basis for asylum and to issue guidelines for evaluat-
ing the claims of women fleeing gender-based violence. According to the
Director of Refugee Protection Policy Citizenship and Immigration Ca-
nada, "the refugee definition is intended to be applied in a generous
manner, rather than restrictively. '"m A generous application, however, is
not the equivalent to a wide interpretation of the refugee definition.205
The Canadian Supreme court has rejected both a wide and a restrictive
application of the refugee definition.206
In accord with this generous approach, on March 9, 1993, the Immi-
gration and Refugee Board issued guidelines pursuant to its authority
under section 65(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.2°7 Canada
199. Id.
200. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMuSSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRrERA FOR DEMIuInNG REFUGEE STATUS 14 (1979).
201. Id.
202. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., supra note 132-133 and accompanying text.
204. Statement by John Butt, Director, Refugee Protection Policy Citizenship and
Immigration Canada Before UNHCR Symposium on Gender-Related Persecution in Ge-
neva (February 22, 1996).
205. Id.
206. See Canada v. Ward, 2 S.C.R. 689, 739-40 (1993) (Can).
207. Section 65(3) states:
The chairperson may, after consulting with the Deputy Chairperson and the As-
sistant Deputy Chairpersons of the Refugee Division and the Appeal Division
and the Coordinating members of the Refugee Division, issue guidelines to as-
sist the members of the Refugee Division, and Appeal Division in carrying out
their duties under this Act.
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was aware that women seeking refugee status may experience persecution
differently than men and that gender may be the very cause of the perse-
cution. m It was also aware of the widespread violence against women
and the discriminatory treatment of women in the international
community.1 9
Under the guidelines, women may suffer persecution in the form of
"severe discrimination on grounds of gender or acts of violence either by
public authorities or at the hands of private citizens from whose actions
the state is unwilling or unable to adequately protect the concerned per-
sons." 210 This definition of persecution also incorporates failing to obey
certain gender discriminating religious practices or customary laws and
practices in the applicant's country of origin.21' In assessing the appli-
cant's fear of persecution, an adjudicator must determine if the country
has violated international law, which has laid out basic standards for the
treatment of women.212 If there has been a violation, an adjudicator must
then determine if the country is actively seeking to comply with interna-
tional standards for the treatment of women.213
Once an applicant has proved a genuine fear of persecution, she
must also show her persecution is on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Realiz-
ing victims of gender-based persecution most often seek to prove perse-
cution for reasons of membership in a particular social group, the
guidelines specifically reject the notion that large numbers of women
cannot constitute a particular social group.214 Thus, women alone or a
subgroup of women can comprise a social group if there is no national
protection and women are particularly vulnerable in the applicant's
country.215
Since the issuance of the guidelines, the Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Immigration Board (IRB) has granted asylum to a victim of
FGM. In 1994 the IRB granted refugee status to a Somali woman and
Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. 28, 5(3) (1985) (Can.).
208. Statement of John R. Butt, supra note 205.
209. Id.
210. Immigration and Refugee Board, Women Refugee Claimants: Fearing Gender-
Related Persecution, Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of
the Immigration Act (Ottawa, Canada Mar. 1993) (Canadian Women Refugee Guidelines)
at 3.
211. Id. at 2.
212. Id. at 7.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 6.
215. Id.
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her children. 216 The applicant, a victim of spousal abuse as well, feared
FGM would be performed on her ten-year-old daughter.2 7 She had un-
dergone the procedure at the age of eight and recounted the horrors she
had endured to the court. Upon her return to Somalia, the applicant ar-
gued she would lose custody of her children because men were automati-
cally given custody after a divorce.219
The ERB found that the woman and her child would suffer persecu-
tion. Somalia's determination of custody violated the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, which entitles men and women equal rights in the
dissolution of marriage.220 The IRB also found the young girl's fear of
persecution was well-founded. Evidence showed that FGM left physical
and emotional bruises on women and children. 22' FGM also violated both
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child.3 Finally, in accordance with the guidelines, the
IRB also examined any governmental action aimed at protecting women
from the practice. Although Somalia has made FGM illegal, 98% of the
women still undergo the procedure.2 23
According to the Board, the young girl's persecution was on account
or her membership in two particular social groups. She was a member of
the group minors and the group women.224 Both gender and age were in-
nate and unchangeable characteristics. 22 This Canadian decision is be-
lieved to be the first in the world to grant refugee status to women based
on FGM claims.226
VI. CONCLUSION
Female genital mutilation and other forms of gender-based persecu-
tion are of increasing concern in the United States, as well as the interna-
tional community. The refugee population is changing and women and
their children now make up the majority of persons seeking refugee sta-
216. P.V. No. T193-12198 (C.R.D.D. May 10, 1994) (Can.). The names were redacted
from the case, and the case number only remains.
217. Id. at 3.
218. Id. at 9-10.
219. Id. at 3.
220. Id. at 7.
221. Id. at 9. Physical effects included infections, bleeding, infertility and AIDS. Id.
222. Id. at 10.
223. Id. at 11.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Clyde H. Farnsworth, Canada Gives Refugee Status to Somali Pair, THE OR-
aoNmAN, July 21, 1994, at A05. Although France recognized that a woman may be given
refugee status based on FGM, no one in France has been granted such status. Id.
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tus. For years, the United States has analyzed female genital mutilation
and other gender-related persecution claims under the strict and restric-
tive standards created by judicial interpretation of the Refugee Act. This
precedent has advocated a narrow interpretation of the refugee definition,
producing disastrous results for women seeking refugee status based on
gender-based persecution. With the opinion of In the Matter of M.K., the
opinions of other recent cases, and the promulgation of INS's guidelines
for assessing women's claims, the United States has decided to follow
Canada's lead and is moving toward a generous application of the refu-
gee definition. This generous application, not the narrow interpretation
used before, of the refugee definition promotes the principles of equality,
nondiscrimination and commitment to human rights, all of which are
enunciated in the Refugee Act's legislative history and in international
law.
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